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ABSTRACT
Policing decisions, allocations and outcomes are determined by mapping historical crime data geospatially using popular algorithms. In this extended abstract, we present early results from a mixedmethods study of the practices, policies, and perceptions of algorithmic crime mapping in the city of
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. We investigate this diferential by visualizing potential demographic biases
from publicly available crime data over 12 years (2005-2016) and conducting semi-structured interviews
of 19 city stakeholders and provide future research directions from this study.
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Figure 1: Comparison of Euclidean and Geodesic k-means clustering for Motor Vehicle Thef for February 2008
Theft - February 2008
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Figure 2: Comparison of Euclidean and
Geodesic k-means clustering for Thef for
February 2008

INTRODUCTION
Algorithms have become pervasive [11] in most facets of daily living. Recognizing the growing
importance of algorithmic transparency debate, HCI/CSCW researchers have slowly started crafing
a broad research agenda in this area including thinking about how data analysts engage in the act of
analyzing data[13] and how experts, non-experts and subjects perceive data[1] to support such goals.
One of the most common applications of algorithms [4, 14] is in the area of crime analysis. Crime
analysis focuses on crime mapping, prediction and forecasting. Results are usually used to develop
administrative policies that allocate policing resources to particular geographical areas or to focus on
specific crimes. What efect could the combination of algorithmic opacity and knowledge have on the
ethical mapping of crime as crime analysts grapple and interact with ever increasing and complex
forms of data? Our research project is atempting to understand such practices and their potentially
unanticipated future consequences through a human-centered lens.
In this extended abstract, we present some initial findings of our mixed methods study of the
perceptions, practices and policies of algorithmic crime mapping in the city of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
We investigated publicly available crime data over a period of 12 years (2005-2016) and conduct a semistructured interview study of 19 professional crime analysts and city stakeholders. Combining our
methodological approaches, our initial exploration of the study suggests some theoretical implications
such as default behaviors analysis among crime analysts.
DEFAULT SETTINGS IN ALGORITHMS
A default refers to predetermined parameters or setings that are being fixed by a computer program
when a parameters or seting is not specified by the program user [15]. Past work has found that
default policies can have a profound impact on users’ final policies and their overall use of a system.
For example, users tend not to change default calendar sharing setings [12], online social network
privacy setings [2, 6, 9, 16], and even organ donation choices[8].
Clearly, how policymakers select the default has important implications. Policymakers ofen have
to decide which of the available options to impose on individuals who fail to make a decision [3] as
people perceive the default as indicating the recommended course of action. It is very important for
the policymakers to be aware of the implied messages conveyed by their choice of default as the user
might rationally decide to stick with this default if he or she adequately trusts the system [10].
METHODS
We started by interviewing two professional crime analysts to get an initial insights into algorithmic
crime mapping practices. We used publicly available crime data about the city of Milwaukee for
12 years (2005-2016) as an empirical lens of investigation. We focused on the ’k-means’ algorithm
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because its’ flaws are intuitive to understand for the layperson. We restricted our analysis to four
common crimes: robbery, simple assault, thef and and motor vehicle thef that are commonly mapped
by analysts. We created visualizations of potential bias and used publicly available demographic
information to create a Potential Bias Index (PBI) (Fig 5.) that we used as visual aids in the next round
of interviews.
Then, we conducted follow-up interviews of 17 people. Eleven of them were professional crime
analysts also working in the greater Milwaukee and Chicago metropolitan area. Six participants were
local community organizers working to improve opportunities and reduce crime in the inner city. We
adopted a grounded theory perspective [5] to our work. Afer multiple iteration of thematic analysis,
initial high level themes have been emerged from the qualitative data.
INITIAL RESULTS & DISCUSSION
Deconstructing k-means for potential biases

Figure 4: potential bias index (PBI) averages for each month for 2, 5 and 10 clusters
ALGORITHM 1: Potential Bias Index
Input: G: geodesic cluster
Input: E: list of unique euclidean clusters in G
Output: I: Potential Bias Index
numGeodes icPoints +- getPointCount(G)
m inorityRatio +- getMinorityRatio(G)
clusterScore +- 0

// for each euclidean cluster found in G
fore ach e; E E do
I I for each point in geodesic cluster
euclideanPoints +- 0
matches+- 0
fore ach pj E e; do

// if euclidean point is in geodesic cluster
if pj E G then
I matches +- matches + l
end
numEuclideanPoints +- numEuclideanPoints + I
end
score +- matches/ numEuclideanPoints
weight +- matches/ numGeodesicPoints
index +- score * weight
clusterScore +- clusterScore + index
end
dissimilarity +- 1 - clusterScore
potentialBiaslndex +- dissimilarity • minorityRatio
return potentialBiaslndex

Examining Lloyd’s algorithm for k-means, we found two inflection points for potential human bias
[7] i.e. (a) the initial selection of clusters and (b) the choice of the distance metric. Considering (a)
(Fig. 3), in practice, values for both thef and motor vehicle thef ranged from 0 to a high of 0.36. The
average potential bias for a given k ranged between 0.069 and 0.17 for thef and between 0.063 and
0.1706 for motor vehicle thef. In general, values of k greater than 4 produced an average bias value
greater than or equal to .14, while values of k less than 4 produced values less than 0.1.
For thef, the gold standard of 5 clusters produced a low potential bias value of 0.0315 and a high
value of 0.3099 with a mean of 0.1442 and standard deviation of 0.0562. Motor Vehicle Thef had a
larger range with a low of 0.0180, a high 0.3495, a mean of 0.1457, and a standard deviation 0.0665.Thef
exhibited lower standard deviation than motor vehicle thef, likely due to the higher number of data
points (900 vs 400). But between both, when high potential bias values are produced, the associated
clusterings typically featured two diferent configurations of the city center, while the clusters in the
northern and southern ends of the city tended to be similar. This is likely due to the sparser nature of
points on the city periphery, while the density of points toward the center of the city created more
"unstable" initializations that result in high potential bias scores.
Considering (b) and looking at a given geodesic cluster, dissimilarity can increase in two ways. First,
dissimilarity will increase when the number of unique euclidean clusters present increases. Geodesic
cluster purity will decrease dissimilarity. Second, dissimilarity will increase if a small ratio of euclidean
points are found inside the geodesic cluster compared to the number of points in the euclidean cluster.
This dissimilarity score can be between 0 and 1. Zero means a geodesic cluster matches perfectly with
a euclidean cluster. If a geodesic cluster contains small fractions of many diferent euclidean clusters,
its score will approach 1. A visualization of this efect is presented in Figure 1 and 2.

Figure 5: Potential Bias Index Algorithm
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Default behavior of Crime analysts
"I didn’t know what these distance things
[metrics] are...I understand the Euclidean
that...the calculation of the straight line
because we learnt it in high school but I
didn’t know that there were other ways to
calculate distance. I just point and click [on
the GUI based crime analysis sofware that
they use developed by a private third
party]"- Jill (28, female, crime analyst)
"When I go to run the clusters [referring to
k-means or other clustering methods], there
are many other options on the menu but I
don’t know most of them so I just go with
the default options on the menu... we were
taught a basic idea of clustering but I didn’t
know that we could have so many diferent
options. - John (37, male, crime analyst)"
"When I started the job, I was told that we
always divide the city into five main
divisions. There is the downtown cluster, the
northshore cluster where all the rich folks
live...you have the northwestern and
southside clusters where there is a lot of
gang activity and then the west side near
the suburbs where a lot of people commute
from." - Kevin (29,male,crime analyst)
"I am not sure how this [k-means
algorithm] works. In school, we were always
taught to think about applying the right
tool for the right job but we weren’t taught
much about what’s under the hood ...we
were told that it [k-means] works very well
for spatial data but we didn’t learn much
else." - Mathew (34, male, crime analyst)

One of the main findings from our interviews is that, on the whole, crime analysts were unclear
about the theoretical design and inner workings of the algorithms that they were using. Decisions
made during data analysis were mostly supplemented with prior knowledge and existing mental
models of the city.
All our analyst interviewees had masters degrees in criminology, crime analysis, sociology or public
administration and had taken a few courses in applied statistics like Mathew. Some participants
reported complete unfamiliarity with statistical distance metrics afer we explained how k-means
worked and displayed our visualizations like Jill.In this case, Jill does not change the default distance
metric (Euclidean) that is provided in the sofware even though other options are present. Others
point to a lack of transparency and clarity within the choices provided by the sofware that they
use and a confusion in selecting appropriate options. This leads them to select default options. For
instance, what John said in the given quote.
This refers to a general lack of transparency in how this third party sofware designs and implements
the algorithms. When faced with a variegated menu of choices, the analysts select the one that is most
familiar i.e. the default option. Taken together, this type of analysis is rule-based and path-bound[13].
It is natural to be paralyzed by a suite of potential options and then choose the most familiar one,
however incorrect it might be under the given circumstances. However, when asked about how they
decide to select the initial number of clusters, some participants responded that they depended on
existing institutional knowledge about crime in Milwaukee. For instance, when asked about city-level
clustering, Kevin referred to extant institutional knowledge that is in all likelihood, already biased.
Any subsequent analysis depends on this initial categorization that is dependent on institutional
knowledge. Therefore, this type of analysis is based on situated decision making[13]. We observe here
that while domain knowledge is very important, when combined together with what we learnt about
the statistical (in)appropriateness of the actual process, there is a lot of potential for mis-classification
and untoward policy making. Relatively few people request to switch from the default regardless of
what the default is. Clearly, the default selected by policymakers has important implications.
CONCLUSION
We presented an exploratory analysis of the ways in which opacity and bias afects professional
crime analysis by focusing on the practices, policies and perceptions around crime in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. We used publicly available data over a 12 year period (2005-2016) as well as interviews of
19 stakeholders (professional crime analysts and community organizers) to make our case. Moreover,
our efort in involving multiple stakeholders to understand this issue is showed to be very illuminating
especially in understanding practices of police departments around crime analysis.
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